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Abstract
This paper presents FIDELIUS—a runtime system for secure
cloud-based storage and communication even in the presence
of compromised servers. FIDELIUS’s design is tailored for
smart home systems that have intermittent Internet access.
In particular, it supports local control of smart home devices
in the event that communication with the cloud is lost, and
provides a consistency model using transactions to mitigate in-
consistencies that can arise due to network partitions. We have
implemented FIDELIUS, developed a smart home benchmark
that uses FIDELIUS, and measured FIDELIUS’s performance
and power consumption. Our experiments show that com-
pared to the commercial Particle.io framework, FIDELIUS
reduces more than 50% of the data communication time and
increases battery life by 2×. Compared to PyORAM, an al-
ternative (ORAM-based) oblivious storage implementation,
FIDELIUS has 4-7× faster access times with 25-43× less data
transferred.
1 Introduction
In contrast to extensive research on client-side smart home
security, the security of the cloud servers that control these
client-side devices has received less attention from re-
searchers. This is particularly concerning—e.g., recent work
shows that if an attacker can control enough high-wattage IoT
devices, the attacker can cause power grid failures [16]. Imple-
menting attacks at scale by compromising individual smart
home devices is not straightforward due to the sheer number
of devices that must be hacked. Thus, compromising cloud
servers can be a more practical approach. In fact, the year
of 2018, alone, has seen a huge number of compromises to
cloud servers, including those operated by many well-known
companies (e.g., Facebook [8], Marriott [3], Sony [23], etc.)
In addition to large-scale attacks on physical infrastructures,
there are other concerns with trusting the cloud: (1) Privacy:
Smart home devices collect a great deal of information about
users [22]. Private data can be leaked if a cloud server is
compromised. (2) Traffic Analysis: It may be possible to learn
information by observing traffic patterns [2]. For example,
such an analysis could reveal that when the thermostat’s mode
transitions (e.g., from Home to Away), it always sends a packet
of a specific length [4]. By watching traffic, attackers could
discover whether people are home.
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Figure 1: System Overview
Our Approach: FIDELIUS Motivated by these security
and privacy concerns, this paper presents FIDELIUS. FI-
DELIUS provides consistency and security to smart home
devices even in the presence of compromised servers in real-
istic smart home environments that include the presence of
intermittent network accesses. Figure 1 presents an overview
of the FIDELIUS system. A FIDELIUS deployment consists of
(1) an untrusted cloud-based server that provides connectivity
between clients, (2) any number of clients that are smart home
devices, and (3) any number of clients that are smartphone
apps. Our server implementation is architected as a FastCGI
server that communicates with the Apache Web Server. We fo-
cus our work on providing a secure key-value storage system
targeted at IoT applications.1 While existing systems use ad-
hoc protocols for communicating data, the standard key-value
1 The Nest thermostat API communicates data in JSON as a tree of key-
value pairs that can be easily stored using a key-value abstraction. Similarly,
Apple HomeKit associates a set of properties and corresponding values with
each device.
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abstraction is powerful enough to subsume a wide-range of
adhoc protocols. We do not impose special requirements on
server hardware; instead, the FIDELIUS enforcement runs on
each client device. Clients communicate with the server; in
the absence of Internet connectivity, they can also communi-
cate with each other locally to maintain functionality.2 This
design is well matched for the smart-home environment where
devices are mutually connected in a local home network.
Contributions This paper makes the following contribu-
tions:
• Secure Transactional Key-Value Store: It presents a key-
value store that provides strong security and privacy guaran-
tees even if the server is malicious.
• Local Control: It presents an algorithm supporting local
control of smart home devices when connectivity is lost.
• Transactional Programming Model: It presents develop-
ers with a transactional model to abstract consistency and
availability tradeoffs that arise from network partitions.
• Evaluation: Compared to Particle.io, FIDELIUS reduces
more than 50% of the data communication time and in-
creases battery lifetime by 2×. Compared to PyORAM,
FIDELIUS has 4-7× faster access times with 25-43× less
data transferred.
2 Threat Model
FIDELIUS focuses on preventing attackers from using com-
promised servers to mount large scale attacks on smart home
devices. The problem of client security for smart home de-
vices is thus outside of the scope of this paper.3 We assume
that the adversary has leveraged other vulnerabilities to ob-
tain complete control over the cloud server that is used by the
devices to communicate. We assume that the adversary has
knowledge of FIDELIUS but does not know the secret key to
which only the clients have access.
FIDELIUS provides the following guarantees, which are
formalized in the technical report [1]:
1) FIDELIUS provides oblivious privacy. FIDELIUS does not
leak any information from data access patterns. However,
FIDELIUS may leak information from timing.
2) FIDELIUS guarantees the integrity of the message passing
layer. It ensures that any violation of integrity is detected by
some client and that even in the case of a detected integrity
violation, the consequences for a client is limited to the same
set of behaviors that are allowed by the non-determinism
from the network, i.e., could have arisen with a honest server
receiving messages from clients in a different order.
2This is already supported in many smart home systems today such as
LiFX and Hue light bulbs, WeMO outlets, and TP-Link outlets.
3 FIDELIUS can be easily used together with any existing client-side
security enforcement technique to provide a comprehensive solution to the
problem of smart-home IoT security.
A malicious server can implement a denial-of-service
(DoS) attack by not forwarding messages. A malicious server
can also partition clients into disjoint groups that it does not
permit to communicate. This attack is impossible for a client
to distinguish from a network failure that prevents the server
from communicating with a subset of clients, and thus FI-
DELIUS provides fork consistency [10] by default.
3 The FIDELIUS System
A key challenge in the design of FIDELIUS is how to han-
dle the wide-range of possible malicious behaviors from the
server while at the same time support local control during
Internet outages as well as intermittent availability of power-
constrained devices. To separate the concerns of handling
malicious behaviors and implementing the key-value-store
functionalities, we architected FIDELIUS as two layers: (1)
a message passing layer that guarantees consistent message
delivery in the presence of malicious servers. This layer han-
dles all issues related to malicious behaviors and does not
implement any key-value-store functionalities; and (2) a trans-
actional key-value store built on top of the message passing
layer. The app code runs on top of these two layers in each
client—app developers can use the FIDELIUS API library in
their code. On smart home devices, this code is the device
controller code. On smartphones, this is the actual app code.
3.1 Message Passing Layer
Conceptually, the functionality of the message passing algo-
rithm is simple: the server algorithm maintains a queue of
all messages that are currently in use; the client algorithm
supports (1) sending messages to the server queue and (2) re-
questing a copy of the new messages in the current queue. In
addition to forwarding messages between clients, the server
stores enough state so that new or long-absent clients can
completely reconstruct the key-value store using the state in
the server’s queue.
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Figure 2: Message Chain
The FIDELIUS message passing layer uses a message chain
to totally order communications between clients that are sent
via the cloud server. Figure 2 presents the structure of the
message chain. Each message in the chain has a fixed size
and contains (1) a globally unique sequence number, which
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is used to reference and order messages; (2) a keyed-hash
message authentication code (HMAC) of the previous mes-
sage in the chain, which is used to ensure the integrity of
chain; and (3) a set of records, which can contain either data
from the key-value store layer or control information that is
needed to thwart attacks—we insert as much data as possible
until the entire message reaches a certain fixed size specified
through the FIDELIUS API. Finally, each message contains
an HMAC of itself, which ensures that the message cannot be
modified. The HMACs are generated using a key known only
to the clients to ensure that the server cannot forge messages.
When a message is transported between clients, it is always
encrypted using the transport key. Together, this ensures that
the server cannot know the contents of messages nor can it
modify them.4
Server Algorithm The server maintains a queue of the last
n messages it has received. Each message has a fixed-size
encrypted block for which the server does not have the de-
cryption key and a plain text sequence number s. The server
algorithm supports two requests: (1) PUTMSG: add a new
message5 and (2) GETMSG: request messages that are cur-
rently in the queue. Before adding a new message, it checks
that its sequence number s is one greater than the previous
sequence number. If not, it sends a rejection message back
to the client that contains all messages in the queue with a
sequence number that is greater than or equal to s. Note that
the clients must verify that the server correctly assigns these
sequence numbers as we do not trust the server. If a client
detects that the key-value store state does not fit in the current
queue, it can request that the server changes the size of the
queue. If a partial message is received, e.g., due to a network
failure, the server ignores the partial message. If queue is full
when a new message arrives, the server drops the oldest mes-
sage. The client algorithm is responsible for ensuring that the
information in the oldest message has been moved to a newer
message before the message is dropped. A request for mes-
sages in the queue contains a sequence number s that is one
larger than the most recent message the client has received.
When the server receives this request, it sends all messages
in its queue with sequence numbers that are equal or larger
than s such that the client now has a up-to-date copy of the
message chain.
Client Algorithm Clients communicates by sending and
receiving messages through the server. Our implementation
uses the CTR mode of AES to encrypt messages. A unique
counter value is sent to the server along with the message.
Clients share two secrets that allow them to authenticate and
4 Although the entire process might seem heavy for IoT devices that
have limited resources, our evaluation energy consumption suggests that
FIDELIUS can still perform efficiently (see Section 4).
5The server could first authenticate participating clients to avoid amplifi-
cation attacks. However, this is out of the scope of this paper.
encrypt messages: a message authentic key and a message
encryption key. These are not known to the server.
When the message passing layer receives new messages
from the server (or they are created locally), the client de-
crypts and validates the messages. Records in messages at
the message passing layer are used to both communicate in-
formation for the key-value store layer and to thwart attacks
that a malicious server may otherwise perform. The proof
in the technical report [1] shows that these checks suffice to
thwart all server attacks: (1) Message Chain Integrity: To en-
sure the integrity of messages, after decrypting a message the
client compares: computed HMAC against the stored HMAC,
s from the server against s in the message, and the HMAC
of the current message against the HMAC of the message
immediately proceeding it, if present, in the queue. These are
used to ensure that the server has not manipulated the mes-
sage chain. (2) Detecting Dropped Messages: A malicious
server could potentially acknowledge a message from a client
and then silently drop the message while a client is offline,
replacing it with a message with the same sequence num-
ber from another client. To ensure that clients always detect
such dropped messages, the client algorithm uses last mes-
sage records to track the last message sent by itself and other
clients so that it can detect whether the server has dropped
messages. A last message record consists of a machine ID
and the sequence number of the last message sent by that
machine. Last message records are only inserted if the most
recent message from a given machine ID is about to be evicted
from the queue. (3) Detecting Reused Rejected Messages: The
client algorithm uses rejected message records to detect if the
server attempts to use a rejected message. A rejected mes-
sage record consists of the machine ID id of the client that
sent the rejected messages, the lowest sequence number slow
and highest sequence number shigh of the range of rejected
messages, and the sequence number of the first message that
contained the rejected message record. To prevent this attack,
each client verifies that each message in the queue that has a
sequence number that falls within the range of slow and shigh
has a machine ID id that is not equal to id. The algorithm
keeps a rejected message record live until all clients have seen
it (as implicitly acknowledged by sending a newer message).6
(4) Detecting Missing Messages: A malicious server could
also attempt to send fewer messages than the queue currently
holds by omitting the oldest messages (noting that the mes-
sage chain integrity checks prevent dropping messages in the
middle). This would cause clients to compute the key-value
store state using an incomplete set of messages. To prevent
this, FIDELIUS uses queue size record to store the current
maximum capacity of the message queue and enables clients
6Since FIDELIUS does not keep the entire message chain, the server could
temporarily fork the message chain and then move clients from one fork to
another if the client is offline for a sufficiently long time such that all the
messages the client has seen have been evicted from the message chain. In
the other fork, the server could could send dropped or rejected messages.
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to compute how many messages they should have received to
validate that the correct number of messages was received.
The message passing layer sends a message and per-
forms the following bookkeeping tasks: (1) Determine Which
Records Must be Refreshed: If a record rec is live (the system
is still using the information they contain) then it must be
refreshed by reinserting the record into the queue before the
message with that record leaves the queue. A record rec is
dead iff one of the following conditions is true: (i) a refreshed
version of rec is present in the queue,7 (ii) rec is a queue size
record and there is a newer queue size record, (iii) item rec is a
rejected message record and all clients have seen it as proven
by having inserted a message into the queue with a s that is
greater than the s of rec, or (iv) rec is a last message record
and a client with the same id has inserted a newer message
into the queue. (2) Construct the Record Section of the Mes-
sage: Constructing the record section of a message involves
(i) checking if the queue needs resizing, (ii) generating and
inserting a rejected message record if needed, (iii) refreshing
older live records before they are evicted, (iv) inserting the
record from the key value store layer, and (v) filling unused
space in the record section with old live records in need of a
refresh. (3) Send the Message: The client next sends the mes-
sage to the server. If the server rejects the message because it
has an old sequence number, then the server returns the newer
messages to prove that the rejected message was in fact old.
The client then processes all of the new messages that were
returned by the server and will generate a rejected message
record to communicate the fact that it sent a message that was
rejected. If the server accepts the message, then the client’s
local state is updated using the contents of the newly created
message. If sending the message fails due to network issues
then the message passing layer has to defer its determination
of whether other clients received the message and the transac-
tional key-value store layer is informed that a network failure
occurred.
Information Leakage A reader may note that the pattern
of PUTMSG and GETMSG requests can leak access pattern
information. This issue can be addressed in several different
ways. We modified the update procedure to always follow a
GETMSG call with a PUTMSG call (simply sending a message
that refreshes entries if there is no request to send). Neverthe-
less, FIDELIUS does not prevent leaks via timing channels.
For some settings, it is feasible to configure FIDELIUS to not
leak information by sending data on a fixed schedule.8
7A resize check is performed first to check if the number of messages with
records which are live in the queue exceeds a randomized resize threshold. If
so, a new queue size is calculated and a new queue size record with the new
size is inserted into the message.
8 We have observed that many smart home devices frequently send mes-
sages to the cloud even when idle: the Nest thermostat sends a packet every
5 seconds, the LiFX light bulb every 7 seconds, and the D-Link smart plug
every 1.5 seconds.
Strengthening Consistency Guarantees Although we be-
lieve that fork consistency is sufficient for smart home sys-
tems, FIDELIUS supports extensions to counter forking at-
tacks and achieve strong consistency [1].
3.2 Transactional Key-Value Store
FIDELIUS’s transactional key-value store is built on top of
the message passing layer. This layer (1) arbitrates/commits
transactions, and (2) updates/reads key-value pairs.
Arbitrating/Committing Transactions Intermittent home
Internet connectivity complicates committing transactions.
There is the potential for concurrent local updates and remote
updates to conflict. In the case of an Internet outage, the cloud
server would not even be aware of local updates. For example,
a remote smartphone attempts to change the thermostat mode
from HEAT to OFF with a transaction. At the same time, a
local smartphone tries to change the mode from HEAT to
COOL with a transaction. These two transactions conflict and
only one transaction can commit and thus we need an arbi-
trator to decide which one commits. To allow local control
during an Internet outage, the arbitrator of this transaction
must be local to the thermostat and the obvious choice is the
thermostat itself.
Updating/Reading Key-Value Pairs FIDELIUS updates
key-value pairs through a PUT function. These updates are
stored locally until the transaction is committed. FIDELIUS
supports a relaxed transactional model for reads. In many
cases it is not important that a transaction reads the absolutely
latest value from a sensor.
4 Evaluation
We developed both C++ and Java implementations of the FI-
DELIUS client and a C++ implementation of the FIDELIUS
server.9 The server for all experiments was a 3.5GHz Intel
Xeon E3-1246 v3 with 32GB of RAM. We have evaluated
FIDELIUS by (1) developing a test bed system, (2) compar-
ing with the commercial Particle cloud in terms of energy
usage and privacy, and (3) comparing with a Path ORAM
implementation [20].
Test Bed Our test bed system simulates a medium scale
smart home deployment with 16 devices. We have two classes
of smart home devices in our test bed: (1) 15 low-power nodes
that use hardware similar to smart home devices that run on
batteries for many months (8 Particle Photons with tempera-
ture and humidity sensors, 4 Particle Photons with magnetic
9 Most existing smart home systems are closed source and it is not clear
what guarantees are provided when there are conflicts. Thus, we cannot imple-
ment our approach to securing smart home devices against malicious cloud
servers directly on these devices. Instead, we implemented a complete system
(with an API library) that uses transactions to support local communication
with clear consistency properties.
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door sensors, 3 Particle Photons with IR-based motion sen-
sors) and (2) one mid-range node that uses hardware that is
more typical of smart home devices that run on wall power
(a Raspberry Pi 1 that controls 2 LiFX smart light bulbs).10
These specifications are similar to the hardware that appear
in commercial devices.
We quantified the CPU overhead of FIDELIUS for typical
smart home device activity (controlling LiFX light bulbs) on
a smart home class CPU (a Raspberry Pi 1) to verify that FI-
DELIUS incurs acceptable overheads. For this experiment, the
LiFX arbitrator had a 2.3% CPU utilization and the Android
app had below 1% CPU utilization.
To validate that FIDELIUS detects attacks, we used a ma-
licious server that implements three different attacks. In the
first attack, the server assigns the sequence number to multiple
messages. In the second attack, the server inserts a rejected
message into the queue. In the third attack, the server swaps
message sequence numbers of accepted messages. The clients
detected all attacks.
Particle Cloud—Energy and Privacy We evaluated FI-
DELIUS against the Particle cloud framework as the Particle
cloud framework has an easily available SDK that has been
used to develop many commercial IoT products. We config-
ured a Particle Photon to read a humidity/temperature sensor
and powered it with 3 AA batteries. When using the Particle
cloud, it takes at least 5.55 seconds to wake up, connect, pub-
lish value, and go back to sleep. The total energy consumed
for the wake-up time of 5.55 seconds is 0.79mWh. Assuming
that it wakes up every hour to do one measurement and goes
back to sleep, the total energy consumed is 1.17mWh each
hour for deep sleep plus reporting a measurement. Three En-
ergizer AA Lithium batteries provide approximately 13.5Wh
and thus, could support measurements for 1 year and 4 months.
When using Fidelius server, it takes only 2.46 seconds to com-
plete the same measurement cycle. Hence, its hourly power
consumption is 0.73mWh, and it could support measurements
up to 2 years 2 months.
The network trace shows that the Particle cloud leaks infor-
mation about the argument lengths. The publish() method,
which allows a device to publish results on the Particle cloud
in a key-value fashion, sends different packet lengths for dif-
ferent argument lengths, e.g., a 16-character argument results
in a 34-byte payload, a 32-character argument results in a
50-byte payload, etc. The function() method, which allows
devices to publish C code functions on the Particle cloud, be-
haves in a similar way. For FIDELIUS, the network trace only
shows a GETMSG is always followed by a PUTMSG request
with uniformly-sized data blocks. We randomized the wake-
up time of our sensors that need to give periodic updates—i.e.,
temperature/humidity sensor. Since every FIDELIUS request
10 The Particle Photon is a low-end IoT hardware development kit with a
120 MHz ARM Cortex M3 processor, 1MB of flash, and 128KB of RAM
that supports 802.11b/g/n WiFi.
had the exact same traffic pattern, we were not able to deter-
mine the type of FIDELIUS request from the traffic.
Path ORAM PyORAM, a Python implementation of the
Path ORAM algorithm [20].11 We tried to run PyORAM’s
Path ORAM on the Raspberry Pi as a client. The results show
an increasing trend of time per access for PyORAM as the tree
height and number of blocks grow, while for FIDELIUS time
per access is always steady. For 255 blocks, FIDELIUS was
already 7× faster than PyORAM—this difference is caused by
the nature of PyORAM benchmark that is bandwidth limited.
As the tree height and number of blocks grow, the total amount
of transferred data also increases faster than FIDELIUS—for
511 blocks, PyORAM transfers more than 43× the amount of
data that FIDELIUS transfers.
5 Related Work
Oblivious RAM techniques, first proposed by Goldreich and
Ostrovsky [6], seek to provide RAM [11, 14, 19–21] or cloud
storage [5, 17, 18] in which the data access patterns are inde-
pendent of the computation and thus no information can be
extracted from the locations accessed. Many oblivious storage
algorithms [6, 20] assume that only one device can access the
storage and that adversary is merely honest but curious. While
some work does support multiple clients [12] or stronger ad-
versarial models [15], these approaches assume that the clients
have limited local storage and thus incur bandwidth and/or
latency overheads for each access.
Much previous work on oblivious storage is unsuitable for
our scenario because: (1) it assumes an honest, but curious ad-
versary, and (2) it does not support multiple clients accessing
shared state. Some recent work has removed the single client
limitation [12] and supports stronger adversarial models [15].
However, most oblivious RAM techniques incur extra over-
heads (e.g., latency or bandwidth) for accesses to storage due
to a fundamental limitation as a result of the assumption that
clients only have a small amount of storage. Moreover, exist-
ing systems are not designed to support updates to persistent
state when connectivity has been lost and thus cannot support
local device control.
6 Conclusion
We presented FIDELIUS, a new secure key-value store, that
is designed to meet the requirements of smart home systems.
We prove that FIDELIUS is secure, even in the presence of a
malicious cloud server. Our experiments show that FIDELIUS
has good performance, low power consumption, is resilient
to attacks, and efficiently runs on smart home class hardware.
11 Path ORAM is one of the few cloud-based oblivious storage system
implementations that are publicly available [7]. Path ORAM assumes the
weaker honest but curious adversarial model.
5
7 Discussion
Feedback FIDELIUS is a privacy-preserving infrastructure
with a specific context (i.e., key-value store). We are seeking
feedback about the viability of FIDELIUS in the real-world
setting with respect to the current trends for cloud architecture.
We are also looking into future directions to extend FIDELIUS
for more complex applications beyond key-value store model
(e.g., cameras and video streaming devices).
Controversial Points First, FIDELIUS distributes key
among devices. However, this could be a bad choice because
the entire system will be compromised if a client gets com-
promised. Second, FIDELIUS tries to leverage encryption in
the communication between IoT devices—this might be too
heavy for IoT devices that typically have limited resources
(e.g., processing power and memory). While a lot of devices
have implemented their communication protocols on top of
secure channels, e.g., TLS, there are still devices that commu-
nicate in clear text for simplicity. Third, FIDELIUS protects
the privacy of clients by concealing the data from the cloud
server. However, the current trend is that cloud servers typi-
cally access clients’ data for analytics purposes.
Likely Discussion We hope that this paper could generate
discussions with the following questions (with respect to the
controversial points and the feedback we look for): (1) How
viable is FIDELIUS to provide privacy and security for IoT
devices with respect to current trends and practices? What
could be the better scheme to distribute keys if we use en-
cryption (with the assumption that the cloud server could be
malicious)? Could we really trust the clients? (2) How could
we develop FIDELIUS better in the direction that follows the
current trend for cloud analytics? FIDELIUS may not be suit-
able for all IoT applications. However, it can be effective for
certain scenarios, in which the user may not want the server
to comprehend the data, e.g., when a company uses a public
cloud service to run its applications, it needs to protect its
users’ sensitive information. We realize that when using FI-
DELIUS, data analytics can still be performed using another
machine (as a FIDELIUS client).
Open Issues FIDELIUS provides security through encryp-
tion and packets with the same-length. However, there is still
privacy leak through timing channels. Although, an obvious
solution is traffic injection [?,?], this could consume a lot of
bandwidth: inefficient communication. Thus, we wonder if
there could be a more efficient solution to secure the timing
channels for IoT devices.
Circumstances for Failure IoT devices typically have lim-
ited processing power and storage, especially for devices that
are most likely to use the key-value store model. Thus, if there
are too many devices that participate as a FIDELIUS client,
the message chain can be too long to fit into the device’s local
storage. As a result, the entire FIDELIUS system could fail.
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